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The unavailability rule and its effects on New York hearsay
exceptions: The confusion surrounding the New York Court of
Appeals' holding in People v. Sanders
The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the
United States Constitution provides that, in all criminal prose-
cutions, the accused shall possess the right to confront adverse
witnesses.' A literal application of this right "would require the
exclusion at trial of any statements made by a declarant who
was unavailable for cross-examination."2 Yet, the Confrontation
Clause has never been interpreted so as to effectuate a complete
abrogation of existing hearsay exceptions.' Instead, the Clause
merely reflects a strong preference for face-to-face confrontation
at criminal trials.4
1 U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The Sixth Amendment specifically states: "the ac-
cused shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted with the witnesses against him." This
right is also guaranteed by the New York Constitution, N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6. The
fair trial requirement exposes witnesses to face-to-face encounters while fostering
the most effective truth-determinative tool, cross-examination. People v. Arroyo, 54
N.Y.2d 567, 570, 431 N.E.2d 271, 273, 446 N.Y.S.2d 910, 912-13, cert. denied, 456
U.S. 979 (1982).
' People v. Sanders, 56 N.Y.2d 51, 63, 436 N.E.2d 480, 485, 451 N.Y.S.2d 30, 35
(1982) (citing Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 63 (1980)); see Mattox v. United States,
156 U.S. 237, 243 (1895) ([T]here could be nothing more directly contrary to the let-
ter of the provision in question than the admission of dying declarations."); JACK B.
WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE MANUAL, § 14.03, at
14-16, 14-17 (1992).
3 Roberts, 448 U.S. at 63 (stating that complete abrogation has been "long re-
jected as unintended and too extreme."); Sanders, 56 N.Y.2d at 63, 436 N.E.2d at
485, 451 N.Y.S.2d at 35. "Indeed, various types of extrajudicial statements have
been recognized as admissible evidence notwithstanding the absence of an opportu-
nity to confront and cross-examine the declarant." Id. The recognition of these vari-
ous hearsay exceptions results from necessity rather than from the Constitution.
Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 722 (1968); WEINSTEIN & BERGER., supra note 2, at
14-16. The cross-examination of a witness has never been considered indispensable.
See id.
On the other hand, the narrowest possible interpretation of the Confrontation
Clause would suggest that the defendant possesses the right to confront only those
witnesses who actually testify against him. Id. This interpretation, however, has
also been rejected by the Supreme Court. Id. at 14-17.
4 Roberts, 448 U.S. at 63 (citing California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 157 (1970));
see Barber, 390 U.S. at 725 (stating prosecution must make good faith effort to find
witness before witness is deemed unavailable); Dowdell v. United States, 221 U.S.
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In their attempts to satisfy the requirements of the Confron-
tation Clause, courts differ as to whether the prosecution, when
invoking a hearsay exception, must first prove that the declarant
who made the out-of-court statement is unavailable 5 to appear at
325, 330 (1911) (noting well-recognized hearsay exceptions such as former testimony
and dying declarations). The right of cross-examination is "a primary interest" se-
cured by the Confrontation Clause. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 63 (citing Douglas v. Ala-
bama, 380 U.S. 415, 418 (1965)). The Roberts court concluded:
In short, the Clause envisions "a personal examination and cross-
examination of the witness in which the accused has an opportunity, not
only of testing the recollection and sifting the conscience of the witness, but
of compelling him to stand face to face with the jury in order that they may
look at him, and judge by his demeanor upon the stand and the manner in
which he gives his testimony whether he is worthy of belief."
Roberts, 448 U.S. at 63-64 (citing Mattox, 156 U.S. at 242-43).
While hearsay exceptions and the Confrontation Clause protect similar values
and "stem from the same roots," Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 86 (1970), they are
not entirely equatable. Id.; Sanders, 56 N.Y.2d at 64, 436 N.E.2d at 485, 451
N.Y.S.2d at 35 (citing Dutton, 400 U.S. 74). The Confrontation Clause encompasses
more than the codification of common law hearsay rules. Id. (citing Green, 399 U.S.
at 155); see United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387, 393 n.5 (1986) (stating that overlap
between Confrontation Clause and hearsay rules is not complete).
' "[A] witness is not 'unavailable' for purposes of ... [an] exception to the con-
frontation requirement unless the prosecutorial authorities have made a good-faith
effort to obtain his presence at trial." Roberts, 448 U.S. at 74 (citing Barber, 390 U.S.
at 724-25). This rule excludes futile attempts. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 74. Thus, if no
possibility of producing the witness exists (as would be the case if the witness died),
"good-faith demands nothing of the prosecution." Id. If there is a slight possibility,
however, that affirmative acts may procure the witness, the prosecution must un-
dertake such acts. Id. "The lengths to which the prosecution must go to produce a
witness ... is a question of reasonableness.'" Id. (citations omitted). The prosecution
bears the burden of establishing whether the witness is unavailable despite good-
faith efforts to procure him. Id.
In People v. McDowell, the witness was a member of the Armed Forces who was
soon to be shipped to Germany. People v. McDowell, 88 A.D.2d 522, 449 N.Y.S.2d
981 (1st Dep't 1982). Fearing that the witness would be out of the country at the
time of trial, the prosecution obtained permission to examine the witness condi-
tionally. Id. at 522, 449 N.Y.S.2d at 982. The First Department found that there was
no evidence that the Army would have refused to return the witness had the prose-
cution requested it. Id. The prosecution's failure to attempt to procure the witness
evinced a lack of the requisite good faith. Id. Thus, the court rendered the pretrial
testimony inadmissible. Id.
See also United States v. Potamitis, 739 F.2d 784, 789 (2d Cir. 1986) (finding
that prosecutor made good faith effort where witness fled to Greece before trial date
was set, prosecutor had aid of United States embassy to locate witness, embassy
representatives met with witness' brothers and left copies of subpoenas with them,
and hired professional process server licensed in Greece), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 934
(1984); People v. Roman, 212 A.D.2d 390, 392, 622 N.Y.S.2d 47, 49 (1st Dep't 1995)
(holding that evidence that coconspirator's attorney would have advised him to
claim his Fifth Amendment privilege if called to testify was insufficient to establish
that coconspirator was unavailable); People v. Rivera, 192 A.D.2d 363, 595 N.Y.S.2d
782 (1st Dep't 1993) (holding that declarant was rendered unavailable by his invo-
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trial.6 In Ohio v. Roberts,' the Supreme Court held that in order
to satisfy the Confrontation Clause and properly invoke the for-
mer testimony exception,8 the prosecution must either produce or
demonstrate the unavailability of the declarant whose statement
it seeks to use against the defendant.9 'Thereafter, in People v.
Sanders,"0 the New York Court of Appeals, purporting to apply
the Roberts test, held that the Roberts unavailability rule applied
where the prosecution sought to admit evidence under the cocon-
spirator exception" to the hearsay rule."
cation of Fifth Amendment privilege).
6 Compare People v. Sanders, 56 N.Y.2d 51, 64, 436 N.E.2d 480, 486, 451
N.Y.S.2d 30, 36 (1986) (holding proof of unavailability is required under coconspira-
tor exception) and People v. Persico, 157 A.D.2d 339, 556 N.Y.S.2d 262 (1st Dep't
1990) (same) with United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387, 399 (1986) (holding unavail-
ability is not required under coconspirator exception) and People v. Tarantino, 156
A.D.2d 244, 548 N.Y.S.2d 504 (1st Dep't 1990) (same).
7 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
8 CPLR § 4517 governs the use of former testimony in civil actions. N.Y. CIV.
PRAC. L. & R. § 4517 (McKinney 1994). It provides that, under certain enumerated
circumstances which render a witness unavailable, "his testimony, taken or intro-
duced in evidence at a former trial, ... may be introduced in evidence by any party
upon any trial of the same subject-matter in the same or another action between the
same parties ... ." Id. As long as the underlying issue is substantially the same and
the same person had the opportunity to confront and cross-examine the unavailable
witness, the former testimony will be admitted. Fleury w Edwards, 14 N.Y.2d 334,
339, 200 N.E.2d 550, 553, 251 N.Y.S.2d 647, 651 (1964).
N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 670.10, however, governs the admission of former tes-
timony in criminal proceedings. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 670.10 (McKinney 1995). It
provides that the former testimony of an unavailable witness may be admitted at a
criminal proceeding where such testimony was initially taken at either a trial of an
accusatory instrument, a hearing upon a felony complaint, or a conditional exami-
nation of the witness. Id.
" Roberts, 448 U.S. at 65. In Roberts, the prosecution invoked the former testi-
mony exception to the hearsay rule and introduced into evidence the preliminary
hearing testimony of a witness who was not present to testify at trial. Id. at 59. The
defendant asserted a violation of the Confrontation Clause. Id. The Supreme Court
found, "in the usual case (including cases where prior cross-examination has oc-
curred), the prosecution must either produce, or demonstrate the unavailability of,
the declarant whose statement it wishes to use against the defendant" and the
hearsay must bear adequate indicia of reliability. Id. at 65-66. (citations omitted).
10 56 N.Y.2d 51, 436 N.E.2d 480, 451 N.Y.S.2d 30 (1982).
" The coconspirator exception permits out-of-court statements of one cocon-
spirator made in the furtherance of the conspiracy to be received against all of his
coconspirators. RICHARD T. FARRELL, PRINCE, RICHARDSON ON EVIDENCE § 8-236
(11th ed. 1995); see People v. Castillo, - A.D.2d __, 637 N.Y.S.2d 84 (1st Dep't
1996) (finding coconspirator exception applied when declarant was fugitive during
trial); People v. Acevedo, 192 A.D.2d 614, 596 N.Y.S.2d 151 (2d Dep't 1993)
(admitting tape recording made by non-testifying codefendant); cf People v. Roman,
212 A.D.2d 390, 622 N.Y.S.2d 47 (1st Dep't 1995) (finding attorney's testimony that
he would have advised declarant not to testify insufficient to show unavailability).
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In United States v. Inadi,3 however, the Supreme Court re-
evaluated its Roberts decision and confined Roberts to the facts
of that case. 14 In effect, Roberts only applied where the prosecu-
tion sought to admit the statements of a declarant under the
former testimony exception to the hearsay rule. 5 The Court held
that the Roberts unavailability requirement did not apply to the
coconspirator exception since such statements derive their indi-
cia of reliability from the circumstances in which they were
made. 6
Since its Sanders decision, the Court of Appeals has not re-
visited the unavailability issue in the context of nontestifying co-
conspirators. 7 As a result, lower courts have struggled with the
question of whether they should continue to follow the Sanders
rule, despite the Supreme Court's clarification of Roberts in In-
adi.1'8 Moreover, the confusion in New York surrounding the
applicability of the unavailability requirement seems to have
infiltrated other hearsay exceptions, such as the excited utter-
ance, 19 present sense impression," and business records2' excep-
Sanders, 56 N.Y.2d at 65, 436 N.E.2d at 486, 451 N.Y.S.2d at 36. In Sanders,
the recorded statements of a coconspirator were admitted into evidence at the de-
fendant's trial. Id. at 61, 436 N.E.2d at 484, 451 N.Y.S.2d at 34. Because the cocon-
spirator died prior to the trial, the Court of Appeals found him to be unavailable as
required by Roberts. Id.
13 475 U.S. 387 (1986).
'4 Id. at 392-93.
"' Id. In Inadi, the Supreme Court confronted the identical issue that was before
the Court of Appeals in Sanders---"whether the Confrontation Clause requires a
showing of unavailability as a condition to admission of the out-of-court statements
of a nontestifying coconspirator ... ." Id. at 391. The Supreme Court concluded that
the Sanders court erred in its application of Roberts. Id. at 392. Roberts did not set
forth a "'clear constitutional rule" as the Court of Appeals contended. Id. Moreover,
the Supreme Court noted that, if it adopted the Court of Appeals' misinterpretation
of Roberts, then no out-of-court statement would be admissible without a showing of
unavailability-a result clearly unintended by the Roberts decision. Id.
'6 Inadi, 475 U.S. at 393-95. See infra notes 62-69 and accompanying text
(discussing rationale of Inadi).
17 See People v. Persico, 157 A.D.2d 339, 344, 556 N.Y.S.2d 262, 266 (1st Dep't
1990).
18 Compare People v. Tai, 145 Misc. 2d 599, 603, 547 N.Y.S.2d 989, 992 (Sup. Ct.
N.Y. County 1989) (holding that, after Inadi, unavailability of nontestifying cocon-
spirator need not be established) with Persico, 157 A.D.2d at 345, 556 N.Y.S.2d at
266 (holding that, despite Inadi, Sanders remains New York rule and thus unavail-
ability of nontestifying coconspirator must be established).
'9 Under this exception, an excited utterance, also known as a spontaneous
declaration, permits the out-of-court statements made by a witness in a moment of
excitement to be admitted in court. People v. Caviness, 38 N.Y.2d 227, 230-31, 342
N.E.2d 496, 499, 379 N.Y.S.2d 695, 698-99 (1975). The statements are admissible if
[Vol. 70:403
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tions.22
It is submitted that the unavailability requirement should
not be applied when the coconspirator exception is invoked.
Likewise, as the Court of Appeals has recently stated, the un-
availability rule should not be applicable to the excited utter-
ance, present sense impression or business records exceptions."
Part I of this Article focuses on how the lower courts of New
York have addressed the coconspirator exception after the Sand-
ers decision. Part II discusses how the Court of Appeals' misin-
terpretation of Roberts in Sanders has created confusion in the
application of other hearsay exceptions. Part III argues that the
unavailability rule should be abandoned when invoking the co-
conspirator exception, as well as the various other hearsay ex-
ceptions where courts have erroneously applied the rule. Fi-
nally, Part IV discusses how hearsay statements should be
treated when the declarant actually does testify.
I. THE COCONSPIRATOR EXCEPTION AFTER SANDERS
After Sanders, the New York rule was readily apparent-the
prosecution must either produce or demonstrate the unavailabil-
ity of the nontestifying coconspirator before his out-of-court
statements may be admitted into evidence.' After Inadi's clari-
made during a continuing period of excitement or fear without "time to contrive and
misrepresent ... ." People v. Brooks, 71 N.Y.2d 877, 878, 522 N.E.2d 1051, 1051, 527
N.Y.S.2d 753, 753 (1988) (citations omitted); see generally Robert A. Barker, 1993-94
Survey of New York Law, Evidence, 45 SYRACUSE L. REV. 361, 374-83 (1994)
(describing case law on present sense impression and excited utterances).
20 In People v. Brown, the New York Court of Appeals held that "spontaneous
descriptions of events made substantially contemporaneously with the observations
are admissible if the descriptions are sufficiently corroborated by other evidence.
Further, such statements may be admitted even though the declarant is not a par-
ticipant in the events and is an unidentified bystander." People v. Brown, 80 N.Y.2d
729, 734-35, 610 N.E.2d 369, 373, 594 N.Y.S.2d 696, 700 (1993).
2' A business record will be admitted if it was made in the regular course of
business, it was the regular course of such business to make the record, and the rec-
ord was made at or about the time of the event. N.Y. CIV. PRAC. L. & R. section
4518(a) (McKinney 1992).
22See infra Part II (discussing how issue of unavailability has caused confusion
in atplication of other hearsay exceptions).
People v. Buie, 86 N.Y.2d 501, 506, 658 N.E.2d 192, 195, 634 N.Y.S.2d 415,
418 (1995) (stating "present sense impression exception does not require a showing
of the declarant's unavailability as a sine qua non to admissibility."). The Buie court
explained that unavailability was also immaterial to the business records and ex-
cited utterance exceptions. Id. at 506-07, 658 N.E.2d at 194-95, 634 N.Y.S.2d at 417-
18.
People v. Sanders, 56 N.Y.2d 51, 64-65, 436 N.E.2d 480, 486, 451 N.Y.S.2d 30,
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fication of Roberts, however, New York lower courts became un-
certain whether Sanders remained the law in New York.25 In
People v. Tai,26 for example, the Supreme Court of New York
County concluded that Inadi had in fact changed the Sanders
rule and held that the unavailability of a nontestifying cocon-
spirator need not be established prior to the admission of his out-
of-court statements under the coconspirator exception. 7 Simi-
larly, in People v. Tarantino,8 the First Department, following
Inadi, held that proof of unavailability is not required prior to
admitting the hearsay statements of a nontestifting coconspira-
tor.29
Less than one year later, however, the First Department
overruled its Tarantino decision and concluded that Sanders re-
mained the law in New York despite Inadi" Since then, every
36 (1982); see People v. Rawlins, 105 A.D.2d 552, 553, 481 N.Y.S.2d 500, 501 (3d
Dep't 1984) (applying Roberts decision as interpreted in Sanders).
25 See infra notes 26-31 and accompanying text (discussing various court deci-
sions). One court avoided deciding the issue by holding that, even if the Roberts test
applied after Inadi, it was satisfied since the nontestifying coconspirator was in fact
unavailable. People v. Warren, 156 A.D.2d 972, 973, 549 N.Y.S.2d 263, 264 (4th
Dep't 1989).
26 145 Misc. 2d 599, 547 N.Y.S.2d 989 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1989).
27 Id. at 602, 547 N.Y.S.2d at 992. In Tai, the nontestifying coconspirator was
incarcerated at the time of trial. Id. Although the prosecution asserted that the
court's evaluation of the unavailability requirement was irrelevant since the cocon-
spirator was in fact unavailable, the prosecution had failed to attempt to subpoena
the coconspirator from State prison. Id. Thus, the admission of the coconspirator's
statements turned on whether the court adhered to Sanders or followed Inadi. Id.
156 A.D.2d 244, 548 N.Y.S.2d 504 (1st Dep't 1989), overruled by People v.
Roman, 212 A.D. 2d 390, 622 N.Y.S.2d 47 (1st Dep't 1995).
2Id. at 244, 548 N.Y.S.2d at 505. In Tarantino, the defendant contended that
the admission of the out-of-court statements, introduced through the testimony of
other witnesses, was improper. Id. Relying on Inadi, the court concluded the state-
ments were not "rendered inadmissible simply because of the declarant's availability
as a witness." Id. Thus, the court held that the statements were properly admitted
under the coconspirator exception. Id.
It is noteworthy that the Tarantino court made absolutely no reference to the
Sanders decision. It merely applied the unavailability rule as set forth in Inadi. This
may have been due to the court's failure to recognize the existence of the conflict
between the New York Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court. Cf Tai, 145 Misc.
2d at 601-04, 547 N.Y.S.2d at 991-93 (evaluating history of unavailability require-
ment from Roberts to Sanders and ending with Inadi).
20 People v. Persico, 157 A.D.2d 339, 345, 556 N.Y.S.2d 262, 266 (1st Dep't 1990).
In Persico, the First Department concluded, "[slo far as can be discerned from this
State's precedents, Sanders ... remains good law and it would appear that the test
set forth in Sanders for judging the admissibility of coconspirator hearsay has, in
fact, retained some currency in recent intermediate appellate decisions." Id.
(citations omitted). In People v. Roman, 212 A.D.2d 390, 392, 622 N.Y.S.2d 47, 49
[Vol. 70:403
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New York court confronted with this issue has held that the un-
availability of a nontestifying declarant must be established in
order to admit hearsay under the coconspirator exception.31
II. THE SPREAD OF SANDERS' UNAVAILABILITY DOCTRINE To NEW
YORK HEARSAY EXCEPTIONS
A. Excited Utterance
The New York Court of Appeals has long recognized the ex-
cited utterance exception to the hearsay rule.32 Nevertheless, the
court has failed to address whether the prosecution must first
prove that the declarant was unavailable before the excited ut-
terance may be admitted into evidence.33 In contrast, the United
States Supreme Court, in White v. Illinois,' another post-Roberts
decision, analogized the excited utterance exception to the cocon-
spirator exception involved in Inadi.35 Specifically, the Court held
that the prosecution need not establish the unavailability of a
nontestifying declarant prior to the admission of the declarant's
excited utterance."
(1st Dep't 1995), the First Department explicitly overruled Tarantino by stating,
"[i]n light of the foregoing precedent... Tarantino ... should not be followed."
' Roman, 212 A.D.2d at 390, 622 N.Y.S.2d at 47; People v. Rivera, 192 A.D.2d
363, 595 N.Y.S.2d 782 (1st Dep't 1993); People v. Glenn, 185 A-D.2d 84, 592
N.Y.S.2d 175 (4th Dep't 1992); People v. Porter, 179 A.D.2d 1018, 580 N.Y.S.2d 117
(4th Dep't 1992); People v. Perez, 175 A.D.2d 614, 572 N.Y.S.2d 550 (4th Dep't
1991); People v. Stewart, 173 A.D.2d 877, 570 N.Y.S.2d 834 (2d Dep't 1991).
22 See People v. Marks, 6 N.Y.2d 67, 71, 160 N.E.2d 26, 27, 188 N.Y.S.2d 465,
467 (1959) (finding that spontaneous declaration is "a true exception to the hearsay
rule"), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 912 (1960); People v. DelVermo, 192 N.Y. 470, 483, 85
N.E. 690, 695 (1908) ("Evidence is admissible of exclamatory statements declaratory
of the circumstances of an injury when uttered by the injured person immediately
after the injury.").
Perhaps this was due to the fact that in Marks the declarant was actually
available and testified in court to her out-of-court excited utterance. Marks, 6
N.Y.2d at 70, 160 N.E.2d at 27, 188 N.Y.S.2d at 466.
34 502 U.S. 346 (1992).
Id. at 357.
Id. In White, the petitioner was tried for the alleged sexual assault of a four
year old. Id. at 349. At trial, the Court permitted the child's mother, the babysitter,
and the police officer who had arrived on the scene to testify to several statements
made by the child immediately after the alleged assault. Id. at 350. The petitioner
objected on hearsay grounds since the child, who was available, did not testify. Id.
The Supreme Court, after revisiting Inadi, concluded that, like coconspirator state-
ments, excited utterances have "substantial probative value, ... that could not be
duplicated simply by the declarant later testifying in court." White 502 U.S. at 353-
56. See infra notes 62-69 and accompanying text (evaluating Inadi rationale).
1996]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
In the wake of this clear pronouncement, New York courts
once again debated whether to follow the Supreme Court's lead
and not require proof of unavailability, or to analogize the ex-
cited utterance exception to the Court of Appeals' holding in
Sanders and impose the unavailability rule.17 Thus, one court
found that the unavailability of the declarant must be estab-
lished,38 while others found that proof of unavailability was not
required.39
31 Compare People v. Torres, 196 A.D.2d 758, 601 N.Y.S.2d 919 (1st Dep't 1993)
(requiring proof of unavailability) with People v. Buie, 86 N.Y.2d 501, 658 N.E.2d
192, 634 N.Y.S.2d 415 (1995) (dispensing with proof of unavailibility) and People v.
Victor R., 161 Misc.2d 212, 613 N.Y.S.2d 567 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1994) (same)
and People v. Cook, 159 Misc. 2d 430, 603 N.Y.S.2d 979 (Sup. Ct. Kings County)
(same), affd, A.D.2d, 632 N.Y.S.2d 193 (2d Dep't 1995).
See Torres, 196 A.D.2d 758, 601 N.Y.S.2d 919 (requiring proof of unavailabil-
ity). In Torres, a police officer testified that the victim, who was unavailable at the
time of trial, screamed, "That's him!," when police brought the defendant back to the
scene within five minutes of the shooting. Id. at 758, 601 N.Y.S.2d at 920. In holding
that the trial court properly admitted the statement as an excited utterance, the
First Department found "[tlhe admission of this excited utterance did not violate
defendant's constitutional right of confrontation, as the People satisfactorily estab-
lished, at a pretrial hearing, ... that the declarant was unavailable at the time of
trial despite good faith efforts to obtain his presence ... ." Id. (citing Ohio v. Roberts,
448 U.S. 56, 65-66 (1980)).
The First Department seemed to be confused in rendering the Torres decision.
It mistakenly expanded the Roberts holding to include excited utterances without
any New York precedent justifying such an expansive reading. It also ignored In-
adi's unequivocal limitation of Roberts to the former testimony exception. See supra
notes 13-16 and accompanying text (discussing Inadi's clarification of Roberts).
" See People v. Cook, 159 Misc. 2d 430, 603 N.Y.S.2d 979 (Sup. Ct. Kings
County 1993), affd, - A.D.2d __ , 632 N.Y.S.2d 193 (2d Dep't 1995). In Cook, the
court found "[ulnless an exception is 'firmly rooted,' the New York Constitution re-
quires proof of 'unavailability' ... ." Id. at 437-38, 603 N.Y.S.2d at 984 (quoting Per-
sico, 157 A.D.2d 339, 556 N.Y.S.2d 262). Concluding the excited utterance exception
was "firmly rooted," the court held that unavailability need not be established. Id. at
440, 603 N.Y.S.2d at 985-86. See also Victor R., 161 Misc. 2d 212, 613 N.Y.S.2d 567
(Sup. Ct. Kings County 1994). The court in Victor R. concluded "It]he excited utter-
ance exception to the hearsay rule is a long standing and firmly rooted one and its
use does not depend on a showing that the declarant is unavailable to testify in
court." Id. at 214, 613 N.Y.S.2d at 568-69 (citing White, 502 U.S. at 346; Cook, 159
Misc. 2d at 431, 603 N.Y.S.2d at 979).
The Court of Appeals, however, has recently addressed whether the unavail-
ability of the declarant must be established before statements may be admitted un-
der the excited utterance exception. See Buie, 86 N.Y.2d 501, 658 N.E.2d 192, 634
N.Y.S.2d 415 (1995). Although the central issue in Buie dealt with the unavailability
rule as it applied to the present sense impression exception, the court began its
analysis by briefly stating which hearsay exceptions do not require a showing of un-
availability. Id. at 506, 658 N.E.2d at 195, 634 N.Y.S.2d at 418. Without explana-
tion, the court stated that excited utterances fell within this category. Id.
[Vol. 70:403
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B. Business Records Exception
It appears the confusion also spread to the business records
exception. In United States v. Davis,4" the Second Circuit held
that admission of a business record is not contingent upon the
presence of its declarant at trial.
41
Previously, however, in McGee v. Walters,4' the New York
Court of Appeals reached a potentially conflicting result when it
considered the implications of the business records exception on
the Confrontation Clause.43 In McGee, a parole report was of-
fered by a hearing officer at a parole revocation hearing." The
court held that upon a specific finding of good cause, adverse
statements may be admitted without affording the parolee an
opportunity to confront the declarant/preparer of the report.5
767 F.2d 1025 (2d Cir. 1985).
41 Id. at 1031-32. In Davis, the defendant argued that the admission of Swiss
bank records at trial violated his right to confront the witnesses who had appeared
at the authentication period. Id. at 1031. The court rejected the defendant's claim,
recognizing that "the Confrontation Clause does not preclude the admission of all
extra-judicial statements when the declarant is not present at trial." Id. The Con-'
frontation Clause is satisfied as long as the business records "bear sufficient indicia
of reliability to assure an adequate basis for evaluating the truth of the declaration."
Id. at 1032.
42 62 N.Y.2d 317,465 N.E.2d 342, 476 N.Y.S.2d 803 (1984).
43 Id. at 319-20, 322-23, 465 N.E.2d at 804-06, 476 N.Y.S.2d at 343-45. McGee
involved the admission of police business records. Id. Such records are generally not
admissible at trial because they are not made in the regular course of business.
Rather, they are made for purposes of litigation. See supra note 21 (discussing busi-
ness record exception). McGee, however, involved the admission of police records at
a parole revocation hearing. McGee, 62 N.Y.2d at 320, 465 N.E.2d at 343, 476
N.Y.S.2d at 804. At such hearings, hearsay may be "substantial evidence." People v.
Smith, 66 N.Y.2d 130, 139, 485 N.E.2d 997, 1002, 495 N.Y.S.2d 332, 337 (1985)
(finding that written misbehavior reports can serve as evidence in prison discipli-
nary hearings), affd, 67 N.Y.2d 899, 492 N.E.2d 1221, 501 N.Y.S.2d 805 (1986).
4 McGee, 62 N.Y.2d at 320, 465 N.E.2d at 343, 476 N.Y.S.2d at 804. The report,
admitted under the business records exception, described the relator's various pa-
role violations. Id. The relator's parole officer prepared the report, but left the em-
ploy of the Division of Parole prior to the parole hearing. Id. The hearing officer
made no finding that the parole officer was unavailable to testify. Id. at 321, 465
N.E.2d at 344,476 N.Y.S.2d at 805.
Id. at 323, 465 N.E.2d at 345, 476 N.Y.S.2d at 806. The court found that,
when deciding whether confrontation was required, a hearing officer must consider:
(1) the general policies favoring confrontation; (2) the objective or subjective nature
of the contents of the report; (3) the extent to which cross-examination will further
the fact-finding process; (4) whether the evidence was cumulative; and (5) the bur-
den which would result from requiring the parole officer to be procured. Id. at 323,
465 N.E.2d at 345, 476 N.Y.S.2d at 806. For example, when "otherwise admissible
evidence is merely cumulative or its substance is objective factual material compiled
under circumstances indicating it to be inherently reliable, no undue burden should
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Since no such finding was made, the court concluded that the pa-
rolee's due process rights were violated.46 The McGee court,
however, did not explicitly state whether unavailability must be
proven-the court merely set forth the proper criteria that must
be evaluated prior to dispensing with the right of confrontation.47
Thus, New York courts have continued to struggle with the
issue of unavailability in the context of the business records ex-
ception.4" In People v. Bridges,49 the Fourth Department, relying
on Roberts and Sanders, found that the unavailability of the pre-
parer of the business record must be established before the busi-
ness record exception may be properly invoked.0 Yet, in 1995,
be placed on the State by requiring it to produce the declarant." Id. at 322, 465
N.E.2d at 345,476 N.Y.S.2d at 806.
McGee, 62 N.Y.2d at 323, 465 N.E.2d at 345, 476 N.Y.S.2d at 806. "[The
hearing officer made no specific finding of good cause to dispense with the produc-
tion of the witness whose statements comprised the only evidence offered by the
State." Id.
47 Whenever a hearing officer must decide if confrontation may be properly dis-
pensed with, he must examine the criteria enunciated by the McGee court, regard-
less of the availability of the hearsay declarant/preparer. See id. at 322-23, 465
N.E.2d at 345, 476 N.Y.S.2d at 806. In absence of such a finding, a due process vio-
lation is presumed. Id. at 323, 465 N.E.2d at 345, 476 N.Y.S.2d at 806.
Furthermore, the McGee test may be said to be limited to the facts of McGee-a
parole revocation hearing. Thus, in the typical business records exception case,
McGee may not be binding. See People v. Klein, 105 A.D.2d 805, 807, 481 N.Y.S.2d
743, 744 (2d Dep't 1984), affd, 65 N.Y.2d 613, 480 N.E.2d 744, 491 N.Y.S.2d 155
(1985).
See, e.g., Klein, 105 A.D.2d at 807, 481 N.Y.S.2d at 744. In Klein, the prose-
cution sought to introduce into evidence loan ledgers kept by the Yeshiva, who had
died prior to the defendant's trial. Id. at 806-07, 481 N.Y.S.2d at 743-44. The defen-
dant contended that he was denied his right of confrontation. Id. at 806, 481
N.Y.S.2d at 744. Concluding the ledgers were properly admitted under the business
records exception, the court reasoned "[i]t is well established that the right of con-
frontation is not infringed by the admission of business records into evidence during
the course of a criminal trial." Id. Moreover, the court recognized the existence of
McGee. Id. at 807, 481 N.Y.S.2d at 744. The court concluded, however, that the
ledgers were also admissible under McGee since "the maker of the source documents
in question is unavailable as a result of his death and the records involved are
plainly of a reliable nature." Id. at 807, 481 N.Y.S.2d at 744.
Although purporting to apply the McGee test, the court failed to evaluate the
five criteria set forth in McGee. See supra note 45 (discussing five criteria). Rather,
it appears the court was actually applying the two-prong Roberts test. See supra
note 9 (discussing two prongs of Roberts).
49 184 A.D.2d 1042, 584 N.Y.S.2d 360 (4th Dep't 1992).
Id. at 1043, 584 N.Y.S.2d at 362. In Bridges, the prosecution sought to have a
hospital report admitted into evidence despite the unavailability of the doctor who
prepared the report. Id. Applying the Roberts test, the court found the prosecution's
unsuccessful efforts to obtain the presence of the doctor at trial satisfied the re-
quirement that a good faith effort be made to procure the witness. Id.
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the First Department stated that proof of unavailability of the
record preparer is not required.51
C. Present Sense Impression
The confusion stemming from Sanders had also spread to
the present sense impression exception. After Sanders, most
courts concluded that proof of unavailability was required.52 Yet,
in 1994, the Supreme Court, Kings County, held that unavail-
ability need not be established prior to the admission of hearsay
under the present sense impression exception. 3
In October of 1995, the New York Court of Appeals ad-
dressed the issue in People v. Buie.' The court held that "the
present sense impression exception does not require a showing of
the declarant's unavailability as a sine qua non to admissibility,
though that factor may be weighed by trial judges in assessing
5' See People v. Vanterpool, 214 A.D.2d 429, 430, 625 N.Y.S.2d 38, 39 (1st Dep't
1995). The court, in dicta, stated that "where the hearsay exception is justified by
its compelling reliability-as in the business records exception-then the eviden-
tiary rule is congruent with the values of the Confrontation Clause and the unavail-
ability of the declarant is not required." Id. at 430, 625 N.Y.S.2d at 39 (citing People
v. Persico, 157 A.D.2d 339, 348, 556 N.Y.S.2d 262, 268 (1st Dep't 1990)); see also
People v. Buie, 86 N.Y.2d 501, 506, 658 N.E.2d 192, 195, 634 N.Y.S.2d 415, 418
(1995) (naming the business record exception as one example of hearsay exception
that does not require proof of unavailability prior to admission at trial).
52 See People v. Crampton, 107 A.D.2d 998, 999, 484 N.Y.S.2d 721, 722-23 (3d
Dep't 1985). In Crampton, the defendant wanted the opportunity to cross-examine
the declarant on the out-of-court statements which were admitted under the present
sense impression exception. Id. at 998, 484 N.Y.S.2d at 722. The court found the
State was required to establish the unavailability of the declarant. Id. at 999, 484
N.Y.S.2d at 723; see also Cook, 159 Misc. 2d 430, 438, 603 N.Y.S.2d 979, 984 (Sup.
Ct. King's County 1993) (holding prosecution must establish unavailability of non-
testifying declarant of present sense impression statements), affd, 632 N.Y.S.2d 193
(2d Dep't 1995); N.Y. LAW REVISION COMMISSION, PROPOSED CODE OF EVIDENCE, §
804(b)(4) at 220 (1992) (stating declarant of present sense impression must be un-
available prior to admission of hearsay).
See People v. Victor IL, 161 Misc. 2d 212, 214-16, 613 N.Y.S.2d 567, 569-70
(Sup. Ct. King's County 1994). In Victor R., the defendant argued that 911 tapes
were inadmissible under the present sense impression exception since the declarant
was actually present in court and testified during the trial. Id. at 215, 613 N.Y.S.2d
at 569. Given the independent significance of the tapes, the court concluded their
admission was not contingent upon the unavailability of the declarant. Id. at 215-16,
613 N.Y.S.2d at 569-70.
" 86 N.Y.2d at 503, 658 N.E.2d at 193, 634 N.Y.S.2d at 416. In Buie, the prose-
cution sought to admit 911 tapes which were recorded when the victim called the
police from his cellular phone as he followed a fleeing burglar from his house. Id. at
504-05, 658 N.E.2d at 194, 634 N.Y.S.2d at 416. At trial, both the tapes were admit-
ted and the victim testified in court to the 911 conversation. Id.
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the traditional probativeness versus undue prejudice calculus for
allowing evidence before a petit jury."55
III. WHEN UNAVAILABILITY SHOULD NOT BE REQUIRED
A. The Coconspirator Exception
Although the Court of Appeals failed to justify explicitly its
Sanders ruling, requiring proof of the unavailability of the non-
testifying coconspirators,56 the subsequent lower courts which
have continued to follow Sanders, despite Inadi, have attempted
to demonstrate why such a rule is necessary. In People v. Per-
sico,7 for example, the First Department reasoned that "the only
possible rationale for dispensing with [cross-examination] is that
the statements [sought] to be admitted ... are so reliable as to
make cross-examination unnecessary."58 The court concluded
that "the declarations of coconspirators are likely to be fraught
with inaccuracies," and therefore, coconspirator statements were
found to be unreliable.59 Similarly, in People v. Glenn," the
55 Id. at 506, 658 N.E.2d at 195, 634 N.Y.S.2d at 418. Thus, while Buie has fore-
closed the unavailability issue in the context of the present sense impression excep-
tion, the pre-Buie present sense impression cases illustrate the confusion surround-
ing the applicability of the unavailability rule.
"6 See People v. Sanders, 56 N.Y.2d 51, 64-65, 436 N.E.2d 480,486, 451 N.Y.S.2d
30, 36 (1982). The Sanders court, without explanation, seems to have blindly applied
the Roberts test to the coconspirator exception. Id.
5' 157 A.D.2d 339, 556 N.Y.S.2d 262 (1st Dep't 1990).
" Id. at 346, 556 N.Y.S.2d at 267. The First Department reasoned that such a
rule was necessary "[gliven the critical importance of cross-examination to the end
which the Confrontation Clause exists to insure, namely, the integrity of the truth-
seeking process." Id.
'9 Id. The court reasoned:
It is true that coconspirators are not, at the time of the conspiracy, subject
to the particular inducements to fabrication present in the context of a
prosecution; they will not yet be tempted to seek exoneration or leniency at
the expense of their former partners in crime. No one would suggest, how-
ever, that, but for the near prospect of penal sanctions, criminals are oth-
erwise to be trusted.
Id. The court found that coconspirators are likely to lie so as to mislead the listener
into believing the conspiracy is stronger than it actually is, with more members and
different aims. Id. Moreover, the court noted that coconspirator's statements are
frequently based on incomplete or erroneous knowledge since the extent of the con-
spiracy is often not fully revealed to all of its individual members. Id. at 346-47, 556
N.Y.S.2d at 267. Thus, the court concluded such ambiguities reflect the need for
perhaps the most effective truth-determinative tool--cross-examination. Id. at 347,
556 N.Y.S.2d at 267-68.90 185 A.D.2d 84, 592 N.Y.S.2d 175 (4th Dep't 1992).
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Fourth Department concluded that the statements of a cocon-
spirator were unreliable because coconspirators often have a
great motive to lie-the desire to avoid prosecution.61
These decisions, however, overlook the unique value of co-
conspirator statements which other hearsay exceptions lack.62
Since such statements are made during the course of the con-
spiracy, they "provide evidence of the conspiracy's context that
cannot be replicated, even if the declarant testifies to the same
matters in court."63 Importantly, the statements derive their le-
gal significance from the circumstances in which they were
made.' Additionally, a coconspirator declarant, who may him-
self be facing prosecution, will have little incentive to help either
the prosecution or the defendant. 65 Furthermore, it is submitted
61 Id. at 88, 592 N.Y.S.2d at 178.
62See United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387, 394 (1986). For example, "former
testimony often is only a weaker substitute for live testimony." Id. It rarely has in-
dependent evidentiary significance of its own. Id. It is merely intended to replace
live testimony. Id.
If the declarant is available and the same information can be presented to
the trier of fact in the form of live testimony, with full cross-examination
and the opportunity to view the demeanor of the declarant, there is little
justification for relying on the weaker version. When two versions of the
same evidence are available, longstanding principles of the law of hearsay,
applicable as well to Confrontation Clause analysis, favor the better evi-
dence.
Id. (citations omitted).
Moreover, unlike coconspirator statements, "strong similarities" exist between
the testimony given at the prior judicial proceeding and the live testimony given at
trial. Id. at 395. Such strong similarities do not exist, however, between coconspira-
tor statements made during the course of the conspiracy and the coconspirator's live
testimony at trial. Id. "To the contrary, co-conspirator [sic] statements derive much
of their value from the fact that they are made in a context very different from trial,
and therefore are usually irreplaceable as substantive evidence." Id. at 395-96.
63Id. at 395.
c Id. In Inadi, the authorities had lawfully intercepted and recorded several
telephone conversations between various participants in a drug dealing conspiracy.
Id. at 390. The Supreme Court opined, "[wihen the Government ... offers the state-
ment of one drug dealer to another in furtherance of an illegal conspiracy, the
statement often will derive its significance from the circumstances in which it was
made." Id. at 395. Coconspirators are likely to speak differently to their coconspira-
tors in order to further their illegal aims than when testifying in court. Id. "Even
when the declarant takes the stand, his in-court testimony seldom will reproduce a
significant portion of the evidentiary value of his statements during the course of
the conspiracy." Id.
" Inadi, 475 U.S. at 395. The positions of the parties at trial will have changed
substantially from the time the statements were made. Id. The declarant and the
defendant, once partners in crime, will have become suspects or defendants in a
criminal trial, each with information capable of incriminating the other. Id. "The
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that an unavailability rule should not bar the admission of co-
conspirator statements for fear of possible ambiguities or inaccu-
racies within the statements; rather, such factors should go to
the weight of the evidence.
Moreover, there appears to be little, if any, benefit from the
imposition of the Court of Appeals' unavailability rule." Cocon-
spirator hearsay statements are admissible whether the declar-
ant is proven unavailable, or if he is available and actually testi-
fies. Finally, "an unavailability rule is not likely to produce
much testimony that adds anything ... over and above what
would be produced without such a rule,"68 since most often, only
those declarants that neither side believes would be helpful to
their position would not be subpoenaed.69
It is also submitted that the Glenn court 7 erred in its
analysis. In Glenn, a coconspirator made several statements to a
police officer which were sought to be admitted at trial under the
coconspirator exception.71 Statements made to the authorities,
declarant himself may be facing indictment or trial, in which case he has little in-
centive to aid the prosecution, and yet will be equally wary of coming to the aid of
his former partners in crime." Id. Thus, it is highly unlikely the declarant's testi-
mony will "recapture the evidentiary significance of statements made when the con-
spiracy was operating in full force. Id.
" Id. at 396 (explaining that whether declarant is available and produced by
prosecution or unavailable, statements can be introduced).
6' Id. "Thus, the unavailability rule cannot be defended as a constitutional
'better evidence' rule, because it does not actually serve to exclude anything, unless
the prosecution makes the mistake of not producing an otherwise available wit-
ness." Id (citations omitted).
68 Id.
'9 Id. at 397. Many of the available declarants will already have been subpoe-
naed by either parties. Id. at 396-97. In Inadi, neither side originally subpoenaed
the declarant as a witness. Id. at 397. When the declarant failed to show up in court,
the defendant made no attempt to secure his testimony. Id. The Supreme Court ex-
plained that each side's failure to subpoena the coconspirator was likely attributable
to the general reluctance of parties to have a coconspirator testify on their behalf.
Id. at 398 n.7. First, the interests of the prosecution and the coconspirator seldom
run together. Id. Moreover, since the position of each coconspirator is potentially
harmful to the other, it is unlikely the defendant would desire to call a coconspirator
to testifiy. Id. at 398 n.7.
70 People v. Glenn, 185 A.D.2d 84, 592 N.Y.S.2d 175 (4th Dep't 1992).
71 Id. at 86-88, 592 N.Y.S.2d at 176-78. The police officer pulled over a car
driven by the defendant because it lacked a rear license plate. Id. at 86, 592
N.Y.S.2d at 176. When his suspicions were aroused due to several blatant lies by
both the defendant and the declarant (the sole passenger), the officer received their
permission to search the trunk. Id., 592 N.Y.S.2d at 176-77. Upon discovering a
suitcase with a combination lock on it, the officer asked the declarant for the combi-
nation. Id. at 86-87, 592 N.Y.S.2d at 177. The declarant stated that he would have to
get the combination from the defendant. Id. at 87, 592 N.Y.S.2d at 177. At trial, the
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however, are not within the scope of the coconspirator excep-
tion. 2 Thus, while it is correct that the Glenn statements were
likely to be falsified, the court improperly classified them as fal-
ling within the coconspirator exception. 3
B. Excited Utterance, Present Sense Impression and Business
Records Exceptions
The justifications for dispensing with an unavailability rule
in the context of the coconspirator exception apply with equal
force to the excited utterance and present sense impression ex-
ceptions. 4 Such statements derive their legal significance from
the circumstances in which they were made. 5 A statement of-
fered in a moment of excitement or when witnessing the occur-
rence of a criminal act-made without an opportunity to re-
flect--"may justifiably carry more weight with a trier of fact than
a similar statement offered in the relative calm of the court-
defendant argued it was error for the trial court to admit the declarant's statement
to the officer under the coconspirator exception. Id. at 87-88, 592 N.Y.S.2d at 177-
78.
72 In applying the Roberts test, the Glenn court concluded the statements were
inadmissible given the declarant's great motive to lie to the police officer so as to
convince him that the suitcase belonged to the defendant. Id. at 88, 592 N.Y.S.2d at
178. Such statements made to police officers are not covered by the coconspirator
exception since they are not made to someone with whom the declarant was en-
gaged in a joint criminal enterprise. See supra note 11 (discussing coconspirator ex-
ception).
73 It is submitted that the court erred both by concluding that the statements
fell within the coconspirator exception and by applying the Roberts test to deter-
mine whether they were admissible. Rather, it is suggested that the court should
have held the statements to be outside the exception and, as such, Roberts analysis
would have been unnecessary.
74 See supra notes 62-69 and accompanying text (discussing reasons for dispens-
ing with unavailability rule in coconspirator cases).
75 See White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 356-57 (1992) (revisiting Inadi rationale
and holding it applies with same force under spontaneous declaration exception).
Notably, such statements are made in contexts that virtually guarantee their trust-
worthiness. Id. at 355. "But those same factors that contribute to the statements'
reliability cannot be recaptured even by later in-court testimony." Id. at 355-56. See
also supra note 39 (discussing how Court of Appeals has stated, in dicta, that ex-
cited utterance is one example of hearsay exception that does not require unavail-
ability rule).
See People v. Buie, 86 N.Y.2d 501, 507, 658 N.E.2d 192, 195, 634 N.Y.S.2d 415,
418 (1995) (holding unavailability rule does not exist in present sense impression
exception). "Virtually no jurisdiction imposes 'unavailability' as an absolute prereq-
uisite to admissibility of present sense impression evidence or its close cousin, the
excited utterance." Id. at 507, 658 N.E.2d at 195, 634 N.Y.S.2d at 418 (citations
omitted).
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room."
76
The unavailability rule should not be imposed where the
business records exception is invoked. As with the excited utter-
ance and present sense impression exceptions, the business rec-
ords exception "carries special guarantees of credibility that a
trier of fact may not think replicated by courtroom testimony."7
Moreover, even courts that incorrectly require an unavailability
rule in other hearsay exceptions concede that such a rule is not
required "where the hearsay exception is justified by its compel-
ling reliability-as in the business records exception."
78
IV. THE ADMISSION OF HEARSAY WHEN THE DECLARANT
TESTIFIES
Under several hearsay exceptions, if the declarant does tes-
tify at trial, the hearsay is rendered inadmissible.7' By analogy,
some courts have seemed to suggest that out-of-court statements
sought to be admitted under the coconspirator, excited utterance,
present sense impression or business records exceptions would
also be inadmissible if the declarant testifies at trial." In People
76 White, 502 U.S. at 356.
77 Id.; see also Perfetto v. Hoke, 898 F. Supp. 105, 111-12 (E.D.N.Y. 1995)
(explaining business records hearsay exception is firmly grounded due to inherent
reliability and does not require showing of unavailability); United States v. Ke-
plinger, 572 F. Supp. 1068, 1071 (N.D. IlM. 1983) (stating admission of business rec-
ords without showing of unavailability is justified because of "inherent reliability" of
business records).
78 People v. Vanterpool, 214 A.D.2d 429, 430, 625 N.Y.S.2d 38, 39 (1st Dep't
1995) (citing People v. Persico, 157 A.D.2d 339, 348, 556 N.Y.S.2d 262, 268 (1st Dep't
1990)). The Vanterpool court stated that where justified by its "compelling reliabil-
ity," the "evidentiary rule is congruent with the values of the confrontation clause"
and unavailability is not required. Id.; see also White, 502 U.S. at 357 (stating
"firmly rooted" hearsay exceptions have evidentiary value and are sufficiently reli-
able); United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387, 400 (1986) (holding Confrontation Clause
does not require unavailability as condition to coconspirator admission); Perfetto,
898 F. Supp. at 111-12 (finding that firmly rooted hearsay exceptions do not require
showing of unavailability to satisfy Confrontation Clause).
'9 One such example is the former testimony exception. See N.Y. CRIM PROC.
LAW § 670.10(1) (McKinney 1995). Once the declarant appears in court, the prior
testimony is inadmissible. Id. Another example is the declarations against interest
exception. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 60.10(141) (McKinney 1995) (requiring de-
clarant be unavailable before declaration against interest is admissible).
8' See, e.g., People v. Cook, 159 Misc. 2d 430, 439, 603 N.Y.S.2d 979, 985 (Sup.
Ct. Kings County 1993) (stating how trial court found, if declarant testifies, there is
"no justification" for admission of hearsay), affd, _ A.2d __, 632 N.Y.S.2d 193 (2d
Dep't 1995).
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v. Buie,81 however, the Court of Appeals addressed the present
sense impression exception and concluded, given the independ-
ent significance of the out-of-court present sense impression
statements, the declarant's testimony at trial does not preclude
the admission of the hearsay.
8 2
Similarly, it is submitted that hearsay sought to be admitted
under the coconspirator, business records or excited utterance
exceptions should also be admissible despite the declarant's in-
court testimony. Such statements have an independent eviden-
tiary purpose that is not capable of replication via the declarant's
testimony.' Moreover, in Inadi," the Supreme Court, address-
ing the coconspirator exception, concluded that coconspirator
hearsay is admissible despite the in-court testimony of the de-
clarant.'
CONCLUSION
Given the unique evidentiary value of coconspirator state-
81 86 N.Y.2d 501, 658 N.E.2d 192, 634 N.Y.S.2d 415 (1995).
Id. at 507, 658 N.E.2d at 195, 634 N.Y.S.2d at 418. The testimony of the de-
clarant does not otherwise preclude the admission of the present sense impression
evidence. Id. The concurrence in Buie argued that, in People v. Brown, the Court
held, if an independent witness is available to testify, "there is certainly no pressing
need for the hearsay testimony.'" Id. at 514, 658 N.E.2d at 200, 634 N.Y.S.2d at 423
(Simons, J., concurring) (quoting People v. Brown, 80 N.Y.2d 729, 736, 610 N.E.2d
369, 373, 594 N.Y.S.2d 696, 700 (1993)). However, the Buie majority properly distin-
guished that argument, contending the statement referred to the "equally percipient
witness" requirement discussed and rejected in the Brown decision. Buie, 86 N.Y.2d
at 508-09, 658 N.E.2d at 196, 634 N.Y.S.2d at 419.
Furthermore, the Court held that the admission of the 911 tape in addition to
the declarant's in-court testimony did not amount to improper bolstering, as con-
tended by the defendant. Id. at 509-10, 658 N.E.2d at 197-98, 634 N.Y.S.2d at 420-
21. The Court reasoned that the character of the tapes was 'different from typical
prior consistent statement material and did far more than 'nimic' the in-court recol-
lective testimony." Id. at 509, 658 N.E.2d at 197, 634 N.Y.S.2d at 420. "Also, because
the 911 tape at issue is admissible under an independent hearsay exception, and
because of this Coures well-established preference for cross-examination of hearsay
declarants, we reject the bolstering concept as inapplicable in this case." Id.
See supra notes 62-69 and accompanying text (discussing independent value
of such evidence).
"United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387, 396 (1986).
85 Id. at 396. The Inadi Court, in doubting the benefits of an unavailability rule,
concluded that if the declarant is unavailable or is available and testifies, his hear-
say statements would be admissible in either event. Id. Even under a rule requiring
the production of an unavailable coconspirator declarant, it would only be when the
prosecution mistakenly failed to call him that his hearsay would not be admissible.
Id.
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ments, it is submitted that the Court of Appeals should overrule
its Sanders decision and dispense with its present requirement
of proof of unavailability prior to the admission of coconspirator
out-of-court statements. This would be consistent with the
Court's reasoning in People v. Buie, where it recognized the sub-
stantive value of present sense impression statements and, thus,
refused to make their admission contingent upon satisfying an
unavailability rule.
Similarly, the independent value of business records and
excited utterances also necessitates the abandonment of any un-
availability rules which may serve to preclude their admission.
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